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Euthanasia by Organ Donation
Euthanasia, the administration of therapy designed to hasten death, particularly
in patients with intolerable suffering, has been gaining in acceptance in countries
around the world, most recently in Canada. Organ donation from deceased
organ donors has always been performed under the strictures of the dead donor
rule, the requirement that donors be declared dead prior to any organ recovery.
Recent scientific and ethical investigations, however, have questioned whether
all donors, whether pronounced based on neurologic (brain death) or circulatory
criteria are, in fact, dead. One potential approach to this quandary would be to
abandon the fiction imposed by the dead donor rule and consider the possibility
of organ donation as another mode of euthanasia. This approach would be
much more precise philosophically, provide such donors with a "good death"
not always possible with current organ recovery techniques, and potentially also
increase organ availability.
L'euthanasie, soit /administration d'un traitement congu pour accelerer la mort,
en particulier chez les patients souffrant de souffrances intolerables, est de plus
en plus acceptee dans le monde entier, et plus recemment au Canada. Le don
d'organes provenant de donneurs decedes a toujours ete effectue conformement
a la regle du donneur decede, qui exige que les donneurs soient declares morts
avant le prelevement de tout organe. De recentes recherches scientifiques et
ethiques ont toutefois mis en doute le fait que tous les donneurs, qu'ils soient
declares morts en fonction de criteres neurologiques (mort cerebrale) ou de
criteres circulatoires, soient en fait bel et bien morts. Une fagon possible de
regler ce dilemme serait d'abandonner la fiction imposee par la regle du donneur
decede et de considerer la possibilite du don dorganes comme un autre mode
d'euthanasie. Cette approche serait beaucoup plus precise d'un point de vue
philosophique, permettrait a ces donneurs dobtenir une bonne mort ,, ce
qui nest pas toujours possible avec les techniques actuelles de prelevement
d'organes, et pourrait egalement accroitre le nombre d'organes disponibles.
* Michael E Shapiro, MD, Department of Surgery, Rutgers-New Jersey Medical School, 185
South Orange Avenue, Newark, NJ, USA 07458, michael.shapiro#_rtitgers.edu. Presented, in part, at
the Second International Conference on End of Life; Law, Ethics, Policy and Practice, Halifax, NS,
Canada, 15 September 2017.
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Introduction
The advent of organ transplantation, beginning with an identical twin
kidney transplant in 1954, has provided new approaches for the treatment
of end-stage organ failure, and saves tens of thousands of lives around
the world annually.1 However, the miracle of transplantation in many
cases is predicated on the availability of organs, which often results from
the heartbreaking death of their donor. The ability to obtain organs from
deceased donors has been the subject of intense ethical and legal debate
since before the first transplant was performed.
Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID), whether in the form of
physician-assisted death (PAS) or in a form of voluntary euthanasia,
has become legal in a growing number of countries and US states (PAS
only). Most recently, MAiD has been made legal in Canada.2 Increasingly,
questions about the potential for organ donation in the context of MAiD
have been raised. In most instances, organ donation and euthanasia have
been considered to be a two-step process, with organ donation sequentially
following MAID, and has been successfully carried out on several
occasions in Europe.3 Nonetheless, the ethics committees of a number
of transplantation societies, both national and international, have refused
to opine about the conjunction between euthanasia and organ donation,
1. FK Port et al, "Comparison of Survival Probabilities for Dialysis Patients vs Cadaveric Renal
Transplant Recipients" (1993) 270:11 JAMA 1339.
2. See Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5; And also, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and
to make related Amendments to other Acts (medical assistance in dying), SC 2016, c 3; House of
Commons, Medical Assistance in Dying: A Patient-Centered Approach: Report of the Special Joint
Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying (February 2016, Joint Chairs: Hon Kelvin Ogilvie & Robert
Oliphant).
3. D Ysebaert et al, "Organ Procurement after Euthanasia: Belgian Experience" (2009) 41:2
Transplantation Proceedings 585.
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for fear they would be seen as supportive of euthanasia itself.4 Current
legislation in Canada requires that euthanasia, in the medical context,
be a voluntary act, requiring a first-person request, and confirmatory
consultations. For the purposes of this discussion, we will consider only
voluntary euthanasia.
In order to consider the possibility of organ donation as a mode of
euthanasia, or (MAID), however, we must first examine the current state
of organ donation, and subsequently, its possible association with MAID.
This will necessitate a discussion of the "Dead Donor Rule" (DDR) in
organ donation, the current status of the definition of death, whether
current organ donation practices comport with the DDR, and whether
MAiD might, in fact, help clarify the current situation, which, I submit, is
confusing. This is not the first exploration of the possibility of combining
euthanasia with organ donation, but it is unique in its focus.5 The goal
here is not to consider euthanasia as a method to increase the number of
available organs for transplantation, though it might do so, but rather to
clarify the process of organ donation to remove confusion as to whether
donors are, in fact, dead, and to confront issues around donation, where
convenient and comforting fictions have been constructed rather than
dealing with more difficult realities.
I. Definition of death
Prior to the development of effective resuscitative techniques and artificial
ventilation in the 1950s,6 there were few issues with the diagnosis of
death. Once a patient's breathing and heart function had stopped, they
were dead. It was only when the ability to artificially sustain signs of life
was developed that the question became unclear.
In 1968, Beecher et al published "A Definition of irreversible coma:
report of the ad hoc committee of the Harvard Medical School to examine
the definition of brain death."' Their primary purpose was "to define
irreversible coma as a new criterion for death."8 They gave two reasons for
4. The Transplantation Society Ethics Committee, 2014, personal communication, the author was
on the TTS and ASTS Ethics Committees at the time.
5. Dominic Wilkinson & Julian Savulescu, "Should We Allow Organ Donation Euthanasia?
Alternatives for Maximizing the Number and Quality of Organs for Transplantationf' (2012) 26:1
Bioethics 32.
6. As an example, see, Edward Radford, Benjamin Ferris & Bertrand Kriete, "Clinical Use of a
Nonogram to Estimate Proper Ventilation During Artificial Respiration" (1954) 251:22 N Eng J Med
877.
7. (1968) 205:6 JAMA 337.
8. Ibid at 337.
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such a definition, both appearing largely pragmatic in their purpose, rather
than the result of new scientific knowledge or a philosophical change.
First, the committee noted that improvements in resuscitation have
resulted in patients "whose heart continues to beat but whose brain is
irreversibly damaged."9 They went on to state that "[t]he burden is great
on patients who suffer permanent loss of intellect, on their families, on
the hospitals, and on those in need of hospital beds already occupied by
these comatose patients."1 Secondly, they state that "obsolete criteria for
the definition of death can lead to controversy in obtaining organs for
transplantation."1
There is no doubt that the care of patients in irreversible coma is a
burden on their families, their caregivers, and on healthcare resources, and
this might motivate one to study whether a change in the status of these
individuals (as dead rather than alive) is otherwise warranted, but it is
not, in itself, justification for such a definition of death. Certainly, none of
those burdens affect the biological, as opposed to the legal, status of the
individual. It is also not clear that such a state is a burden on the patient
themselves, as they are obviously unaware of their state. Similarly, while
obtaining organs for transplantation might be a meritorious goal, that does
not in and of itself justify a change in the definition of death.
At the time of the Harvard paper, the law in the United States held that
death occurred when, and only when, circulation and respiration ceased.
In order to allow for the diagnosis of brain death as death, legislation was
proposed and uniformly adopted. The Uniform Determination of Death
Act (UDDA) states that "[a]n individual who has sustained either (1)
IRREVERSIBLE cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2)
IRREVERSIBLE cessation of ALL functions of the entire brain including
the brain stem, is dead" (emphasis added).1 2
Similar recommendations regarding the neurological determination
of death were promulgated by a medical forum in Canada. 3 These
recommendations, though commonly used in Canadian hospitals, have not
been enshrined in legislation.
It is important to note that the legal definitions and biological
definitions of death of the organism as a whole may not coincide. From
9. Ibid
10. Ibid
11. Ibid
12. US, Uniform Determination ofDeath Act, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (1980) at 5, Approved by the American Medical Association on 19 October 1980 and by
the American Bar Association on 10 February 1981.
13. Sam Shemie et al, "Severe Brain Injury to Neurological Determination of Death: Canadian
Forum Recommendations" (2006) 174:6 CMAJ S1.
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the perception of the transplant professional, there would be no benefit to
recovering organs from deceased donors if their organs were biologically
dead (that is, if there was no integrated function of the organ, such as the
ability of the heart to beat in an organized manner, or even isolated cellular
function).14 The death of the organism as a whole is, therefore, a process,
that might occur in a few minutes (e.g., brain), an hour (e.g., kidney), or
many hours (e.g., skin, cornea).
II. Current process of organ retrieval
Organ donation can take place from either living or deceased donors.
Under normal circumstances, living donors can donate one of a pair of
organs, such as a kidney or a lung, or a portion of an unpaired organ, such
as a lobe of the liver. For obvious reasons, living donors cannot donate an
entire unpaired organ, such as the heart or the entire liver, as that would
result in the death of the donor. Further, potential living donors have been
denied the right to donate their second kidney, which would make them
dialysis-dependent, based on the ethical principle of non-maleficence. One
alternate method of living donation, imminent death donation, proposes
removing a single, paired organ, such as a kidney, from a patient shortly
(hours or days) before removal of life-sustaining therapy, in a setting
where donation after circulatory determination of death (DCDD-see
below) was unlikely to be successful.15 Others have suggested that both
kidneys could be removed in this manner, as the patient would be unlikely
to die from renal failure prior to the removal from life-sustaining therapy.
There are numerous regulatory concerns about this approach, not least the
transplant network requirement to report and investigate all living donor
deaths.
When organs are recovered from deceased donors, there are two
approaches, depending on the mode of declaration of death. These
techniques have been developed to simultaneously address the need for
organs to be well-perfused prior to organ recovery, in order to maximize
the subsequent function of the organ after transplantation, and the
requirement to follow the 'Dead Donor Rule," that is, to assure the donor
is, in fact, dead at the time of organ recovery. 6 We shall subsequently
14. Franklin Miller & Robert Truog, Death Dying and Organ Transplantation: Reconstructing
Medical Ethics at the End ofLife (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 60; D Alan Shewmon,
"The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights Into the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating
'Brain Death' with Death" (2001) 26:5 J Medicine & Philosophy 457.
15. Paul Morrissey, "The Case forKidney DonationBefore End-of-Life Care" (2012) 12:6 American
J Bioethics 1.
16. Robert Veatch, "TheDead DonorRule: True by Definition" (2003) 3:1 American J Bioethics 10.
158 The Dalhousie Law Journal
develop the premise that the DDR is routinely violated, and that MAiD
might be an avenue to deal with this philosophical and biological problem.
In the first approach, a patient declared dead by neurological criteria
(brain dead), is the donor. The donor is brought to the operating room
with ventilator support and any pharmacologic support necessary to
maintain adequate organ perfusion. The organs are dissected to their
vascular pedicles, then flushed in situ with cold preservative solution,
then removed. Once flushing begins, the ventilator is disconnected. The
time of death is the time the patient was previously pronounced dead by
neurologic criteria, prior to organ donation.
1 7
The second technique, Donation after Circulatory Death (DCD
or DCDD, previously known as donation after cardiac death, or non-
heart-beating organ donation), is used for ventilator-dependent patients
with severe central nervous system injury, but who have not, and are
not anticipated to progress to brain death.18 This was the only technique
available prior to the establishment of brain-death criteria, but became
rarely used after that time, as the quality and quantity of organs recovered
from brain dead donors was superior. An improved protocol for DCDD,
"controlled DCDD", became popular again in the early 2000s, because of
the growing shortage of available organs, and the rarity of potential brain-
dead donors. 9 These patients, or their surrogates, have made the decision
to withdraw life-sustaining therapy, and also wish to become organ donors.
The patients are (usually) transported to the operating room, along with
their ICU care team, who retains responsibility for their end-of-life care,
and ultimately pronounces death. In some hospitals, the patients' families
are permitted to accompany them to the operating room if they desire, and
to stay through the dying (but not organ recovery) process. The transplant
team is not involved until after death is pronounced, so as to avoid any
possible appearance of conflict of interest. The ventilator is removed, and
the patient receives appropriate sedation to maintain comfort. Monitoring
equipment assists in the determination of the cessation of circulation.
A waiting period, usually 2-5 minutes, is then observed to assure the
patient does not spontaneously regain circulation, after which the patient
is pronounced dead.20 Organs are then expeditiously recovered from the
17. DSC Ko & AB Cosimi, "The Donor and Donor Nephrectomy," in PJ Morris, ed, Kidney
Transplantation, Principles and Practice, 5th ed (NewYork: WB Saunders, 2001) at 89-105.
18. Institute of Medicine, Non-heart-beating organ transplantation: Medical and ethical issues in
procurement (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997) at 1-4; JL Bernat et al, "Report of a
National Conference on Donation after Cardiac Death" (2006) 6:2 American J Transplantation 281.
19. JL Bernat et al, ibid.
20. JL Bernat, ibidat 282.
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donor. The potential for DCDD organ recovery is limited by the elapsed
time between the removal of life-sustaining therapy and the death of the
patient, as the organs may receive inadequate circulation and oxygenation
during this time. Typically, livers are not procured if more than 30 minutes
has transpired before death, and kidneys not after 60-90 minutes.21 Further,
those organs, such as the heart, which are particularly sensitive to oxygen
deprivation, are rarely, if ever, recovered following a DCDD protocol. The
fact that a few hearts have been recovered, albeit with particularly short
waiting times, and in children, is the reason for the change in terminology
from "cardiac" to "circulatory" death.22
As a larger number of organ donors are considered for DCDD
protocols, the number who do not progress to death within an acceptable
time frame has increased. There are screening tests purported to predict
which patients will succumb in a timely manner, but these have low
sensitivity.23 None of these patients survive to leave the hospital, but they
may succumb a few hours to a day or two later. Often, families, who may
have struggled with the decision to approve organ donation, or have viewed
donation as a way to ameliorate the grief of their loved one's death, are
distressed that the patient was unable to become a donor.24 Additionally, in
my experience, because of the poor availability of operating rooms during
the day, DCDD often takes place late in the evening, and frequently after
the ICU staff experienced in end-of-life care have gone home. This can,
on occasion, lead to less than optimal sedation by physicians unfamiliar
with the concept of double effect, and concerned about hastening death in
the process of assuring comfort. Thus, although the goal is for the patient
to have as comfortable a death during a DCDD procedure as they would in
the ICU were they not to be a donor, this is not always the case.25
21. Ibidat 283.
22. See for example, Mark Boucek et al, "Pediatric Heart Transplantation after Declaration of
Cardiocirculatory Death" (2008) 359:7 N Eng J Med 709.
23. Jonathan Lewis et al, "Development of the University of Wisconsin Donation after Cardiac
Death Evaluation Tool" (2003) 13:4 Progress in Transplantation 265 at 270.
24. Lauren Taylor et al, "Harms of Unsuccessful Donation After Circulatory Death: An Exploratory
Study" (2017) 18:2 American J Transplantation 402.
25. Michael Shapiro & Frances Ward, "The Problem With DCDD is the Dead Donor Rule" (2015)
15:8 American Journal of Bioethics 15 at 15-16.
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III. Issues with the determination of death
The question has been previously raised as to whether organ donors
are dead at the time of donation.26 These concerns relate to both the
circumstances of cardio-circulatory death and neurological (brain) death.
We shall consider these two questions separately.
Regarding circulatory and pulmonary death, the issue raised is whether,
at the time of DCDD, the patient is irreversibly dead. Logically, one can
only be certain that something is irreversible if one attempts, and fails,
to reverse it, or if there are unequivocal data demonstrating that attempts
in such a circumstance are invariably unsuccessful. Neither of these
circumstances exist in the DCDD setting. The data regarding spontaneous
restoration of circulation is quite solid; there are no reports of spontaneous
restoration of cardiac activity and circulation after five minutes.27 But it is
likely that, two to five minutes following circulatory arrest, with an attempt
at resuscitation, at least a few of those patients could be resuscitated, and
circulation restored, if only temporarily. Of course, this question might
also be raised in a patient who arrests with a "do not resuscitate" order.
Here, the reason the patient cannot be resuscitated is that the decision
has been made that the patient will not be resuscitated. There has been
an extensive literature discussing whether one can substitute the term
"permanent" for "irreversible" in the UDDA, and similar international
consensus documents, to deal with those instances where cessation of
circulatory or brain functions is only "irreversible" because a decision has
been made not to attempt to reverse them.28 Clearly, however, whether one
considers circulatory death to be based on an irreversible or permanent
cessation of circulation, circulatory death as regularly observed is a social
or legal construct, and not a biological one.29
A similar problem also exists when one considers death declared
on the basis of neurologic criteria. Recall that this requires "Irreversible
26. Compare the following, James Bernat, "Point: Are Donors After Circulatory Death Really
Dead, and Does it Matter? Yes and Yes" (2010) 138:1 Chest 13; Robert Truog & Franklin Miller
"Counterpoint: Are Donors After Circulatory Death Really Dead, and Does it Matter? No and Not
Really" (2010) 138:1 Chest 16; Robert Veatch, "Abandon the Dead Donor Rule or Change the
Definition of Death?" (2004) 14:3 Kennedy Institute Ethics J 261.
27. Bernat et al, supra note 18.
28. Don Marquis, "Are DCD Donors Dead?" (2010) 40:3 Hastings Center Report 24; James Bernat
et al, "The circulatory-respiratory determination of death in organ donatiof' (2010) 38:3 Critical Care
Medicine 963; Frankin Miller & Robert Truog, "Rethinking the Ethics of Vital Organ Donations"
(2008) 38:6 Hastings Center Report 38; Veatch, RM, Donating Hearts after Cardiac Death-Reversing
the Irreversible" (2008) 359:7 N Eng J Med 672; Michael Nair-Collins, "Taking science seriously in
the debate on death and organ transplantatiof' (2015) 45:6 Hastings Center Report 1.
29. Franklin Miller, Robert Truog & Dan Brock, "Moral Fictions and Medical Ethics" (2010) 24:9
Bioethics 453.
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cessation of all functions of the entire brain including the brain stem."3
Current criteria for the diagnosis of brain death do not actually measure
all functions of the brain or brain stem, but are limited to absence of
consciousness, responses to external stimuli, apnea (no respiratory drive),
and absence of brain stem reflexes. Some of these individuals, however,
have been shown to retain hormonal functions dependent on brain activity,
such as regulation of body temperature, maintenance of fluid volume,
and even such complex hormonal functions as sexual maturation and
maintenance of pregnancy.3 1 Further, the argument to equate brain death
with death is dependent upon the rationale that the brain is necessary for
the integrative functions of the organism as a whole, and therefore its
death is tantamount to the death of the entire being. This very concept has
been subject to question as well.32
A further potential confusion arises from the current United States
(California) case, in which the parent of a child (Jahi McMath) declared
brain dead in 2013, but whose body has been maintained on a ventilator
since that time, has petitioned the court to invalidate the child's certificate
of death, and declare that the child "is not now and was never 'brain
dead."' 33 The possibility that the declaration of death by neurologic
criteria, after careful examination by a number of expert physicians, could
subsequently (four years later) be reversed, indicating either that death
had never occurred, or that a patient correctly diagnosed as dead was
now alive, would create chaos, not only for the current practice of organ
donation and recovery, but for the management of severely brain-injured
individuals overall.
Why, then, do we twist ourselves in knots in order to conclude that
organ donors are dead at the time of donation? Organ transplantation
has always vociferously defended its adherence to the dead donor rule.
Society, and physicians, have held that physicians should not participate
in killing their patients since at least the time of Hippocrates.34 This view
also dominates the current political landscape. In his book, The Future of
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, Gorsuch (now Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court) writes, "all human beings are intrinsically
valuable and the intentional taking of human life by private persons is
30. See, supra note 12 and the text accompanying above.
31. Shewmon 200 1, supra note 14; Franklin Miller & Robert Truog, supra note 14 at 6 1.
32. Franklin Miller & Robert Truog, ibid at 59ff
33. McMath v California, 2016 WL 11018782 (ND Cal).
34. Steven H Miles, The Hippocratic Oath and the Ethics ofMedicine (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004).
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always wrong."" In attempting to satisfy this widely accepted tenet, in
order to avoid the accusation that organ donation involves the intentional
killing of the donor, and to maintain public support for organ donation, the
biologic fiction that the donor is dead prior to donation (i.e., the DDR) has
been maintained. There has been deep suspicion, in some communities,
that those involved in organ procurement might somehow short-circuit
life-saving attempts for their loved ones by physicians. The organ donation
community, probably correctly, has been concerned that any question as
to whether potential donors are, in fact, dead would raise more concerns
among the public that hospitals were more interested in recovering organs
than saving lives.36
IV. Double effect
Given the belief in the medical community that intentionally ending the life
of a patient (i.e., killing), is wrong,37 what then, is the justification, of the
end-of-life procedures involved in the DCDD process, such as removing
the breathing tube from the patient's trachea, or providing sedation so that
the patient is comfortable throughout the dying process, even if that were
to result in some hastening of the death of the patient? These practices
have been justified on the basis of the doctrine of double effect (DDE),
an important part of Catholic moral philosophy since Thomas Aquinas
described it in the late 13th century to justify killing in the act of self-
defense, and more recently a concept intrinsic to modem end-of life care.38
As we shall see however, this concept fails to explain actual behavior, both
in the ICU and as part of DCDD. The doctrine of double effect requires
four principles to be fulfilled (Table 1).
Table 1
Criteria required for the Principle of Double Effect
1. that the action in itself be good, or at least indifferent
2. that the good effect, and not the evil effect be intended
3. that the good effect not be produced by the evil effect
4. that there be proportionality between the good and evil effect
35. Neil M Gorsuch, The Future ofAssisted Suicide andEuthanasia (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2006).
36. Jeffrey M Prottas, "Encouraging Altruism: Public Attitudes and the Marketing of Organ
Donation" (1983) 61:2 Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society 278 at 290.
37. Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: the Collapse of our Traditional Ethics (New York: St
Martin's Griffin, 1994).
38. Joseph M Boyle Jr, "Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect" (1980) 90:4 Ethics
527.
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Thus, administering pain medicine to a cancer patient suffering from
severe pain is justified, even if it might cause respiratory depression,
as long as the goal is pain relief and not the patient's death.39 There is
evidence that, in the setting of advanced cancer, the use of opioids does not
accelerate dying,4" but this may be different from "terminal sedation" in
the ICU. In the instance of the removal of life-sustaining therapy, such as
the ventilator, either in the usual ICU setting, or in the DCDD process, the
good effect is, putatively, relief of the suffering or undue burden caused
by the ventilator or the endotracheal tube itself, and that the death of the
patient, though foreseen, is neither intended, nor the mechanism through
which the suffering is relieved. Death, then, is the natural result of the
patient's underlying disease, and not the actions of the physician. Of course,
a comatose patient is not suffering from the presence of the endotracheal
tube, though it may be argued that the artificial life-prolonging therapy is
an assault on the patient's dignity. Thus, removing the ventilator is not so
much to relieve suffering (of the patient-it may do so for the family, or
of those providing care to the patient), but, in fact, to end the life of the
patient.
Given the reliance on the concept of double effect to justify current
end-of-life care, and the prohibition against euthanasia in the US and
elsewhere, it is worth examining the actual motivation of physicians in
such circumstances. The most relevant studies are from Australia. The law
has been clear in Australia (and elsewhere) that, in order for palliative care
to comport with acceptable standards, administration of medication must
be for the purpose of relieving pain, and not intended to cause the death
of the patient.41 However, at least two surveys of physicians in Australia
have shown that, often, the hastened death of the patient was the intended
goal.42
Kuhse, et al, surveyed 3000 doctors randomly selected in specialties
where there would be the possibility of making a medical end-of-life
decision. Of the respondents who had been involved in a patient death in
the previous 12 months, there were 1112 physicians, of whom 800 made a
39. Daniel P Sulmasy, "'Reinventing' the Rule of Double Effect" in Bonnie Steinbock, ed, The
Oxford Handbook ofBioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) 114.
40. Nigel Sykes & Andrew Thorns, "The use of opioids and sedatives at the end of life" (2003) 4:5
Lancet Oncology 312.
41. BP White, L Willmott & M Ashby, "Palliative Care, double effect and the Law in Australia"
(2011) 41:6 Internal Med J 485.
42. Helha Kuhse et al, "End-of-life decisions in Australian medical practice" (1997) 166:4 Med J
Aust 191; Charles D Douglas et al, "The intention to hasten death: a survey of attitudes and practices
of surgeons in Australia" (2001) 175:10 Med J Aust 511.
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decision intended either to shorten life or foreseen as probably or certainly
shortening life. The results of their study are seen here:
Table 2
Of the 800 physicians who reported shortening life:
Action Number Percentage
Euthanasia 26 3.2%
Ending life without patient's 51 6.4%
request
Decision not to treat 289 36.1%
No intention to hasten death 55 19%
Explicit intention to hasten death 234 81%
Alleviating pain with large doses opioids 434 54.2%
No intention to hasten death, with opioids 335 77.20
Partial intention to hasten death, with 99 22.8%
opioids
In a subsequent study, Douglas, et al surveyed 992 general surgeons,
with a response rate of 68.9%.43 When asked, "Have you ever, for
the purpose of relieving a patient's suffering, given drugs (orally or
parenterally, by bolus or by infusion) in doses greater than those required
to relieve symptoms, with the intention of hastening the patient's death?"
36.2% answered affirmatively.44 In response to the question, "Do you
believe that there are any circumstances in which it is morally acceptable
to give a terminally ill patient sedatives or analgesics by slow intravenous
infusion, in doses greater than those required to relieve symptoms, with
the intention of hastening the patient's death?," 54.1% again responded
positively.45
Thus, in both of these surveys, approximately 30% of physicians
reported they had either given drugs or withdrawn or withheld life-
sustaining treatments (such as a ventilator) with the explicit purpose of
shortening the patient's life. In those settings, the notion that one was
"merely" relieving suffering, or "allowing a natural death" was not, in fact
true, nor was the DDE applicable. These physicians were intentionally
performing an act to end the patient's life. Though in many cases, the act
may have also relieved suffering, ending the patient's life was the primary,
43. Douglas et al, ibid at 513.
44. Ibid at 521.
45. Ibid
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not coincident, aim of the act. Similar results have been obtained in studies
performed in Europe.46
Is it important to make the distinction between providing, at a patient's
request, a treatment intended to cause the patient's death (euthanasia), and
withdrawing or withholding a treatment, either because the patient finds
that treatment burdensome, or because the patient intends the withdrawal
of the treatment to cause his death. While euthanasia, in the form of
MAID, is now permissible in Canada under certain circumstances, it
is currently illegal in all states in the US, and in many other countries.
The distinction between withdrawing therapy and causing death is thus
relevant. A change in law would be required in one or more of the United
States to permit organ donation as a form of euthanasia. The distinction
between "permitting natural death" and "euthanasia," or "causing a
patient's death," or less politely, "killing" has been discussed at great
length by philosophers and ethicists.4" The distinction rests, first, on the
notion that removing a breathing tube, or turning off the ventilator, is a
passive behavior, and death results not from removal of the tube, but rather
the patient's underlying disease that causes them to be unable to breathe on
their own. Second, the claim that the patient is dying of their underlying
disease, rather than the removal of the tube is also suspect. Many patients,
such as those with a high spinal cord injury, or with amyotropic lateral
sclerosis (ALS, Lou Gehrig's disease) may live for months or even many
years with the aid of the ventilator. It is the discontinuation of artificial
respiration that results in the death of the patient at the time they die, rather
than the disease process. The distinction between permitting natural death,
such as employed in DCDD donation, and actively causing death does not
stand up to close scrutiny.
V. Organ donation via medical assistance in dying Euthanasia
The preceding arguments make plain that (1) many organ donors, though
fulfilling the legal definition of death, are not dead in a biological sense, (2)
physicians often intend to hasten death when discontinuing life-sustaining
therapies, and thus (3) neither the DDR nor the principle of double effect
apply. MAiD might thus be a more transparent approach to the organ
donor. How might MAiD be accomplished through the process of organ
donation? The Canadian example for MAID, often defined elsewhere as
euthanasia, and not including physician-assisted suicide, might serve as
46. Georg Bosshard et al, "Intentionally hastening death by withholding or withdrawing treatment"
(2006) 118:11 Weiner Klinische Wochenschrift 322.
47. See, e.g., FM Kamm, Bioethical Prescriptions: to Create, End, Choose, and Improve Lives (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 99-107; Singer, supra note 37 at 57-80.
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a model. The Canadian law stems from a court opinion. On 6 February
2015, in Carter v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada declared section
14 and section 24 1(b) of the Criminal Code void
insofar as they prohibit physician-assisted death for a competent adult
person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of life; and (2) has
a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness,
disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to
the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition. 'Irremediable',
it should be added, does not require the patient to undertake treatments
that are not acceptable to the individual. 48
The Court suspended its declaration to allow for Parliament to respond,
should it so choose. A legislative committee report was developed and
legislation was subsequently promulgated. 49
One aspect of the Committee report affirmed "that MAID should be
able to be performed in any appropriate location, not only in hospitals,
including in a person's home.""0 Thus, MAiD could reasonably take place
in an operating room. The committee, in ensuring adequate safeguards
were in place to avoid coercion, required informed consent, capacity
to make the decision, and a request in writing. Clearly, this might limit
the available circumstances for MAiD and organ donation, and may,
in the future, require change in law. In particular, the recommendation
that advance requests not be permitted prior to being diagnosed with the
condition responsible for the request for MAiD would preclude those
patients suffering from a sudden, unpredicted event (such as a traumatic
event or severe stroke), as the event would render them unable to express
such a desire. Nonetheless, cases do currently exist that fit the requirements
of current legislation (see below).
If practiced, MAiD and organ donation might be performed either
sequentially or simultaneously. In the former setting, the patient would
be assisted in dying via the administration of a lethal dose of medication
or multiple medications, as is current practice with MAID, death would
be pronounced as in traditional DCDD donation, and then rapid organ
recovery would be performed. 1 This approach has the advantage over
48. Carter v Canada (AG), supra note 1 at para 127.
49. House of Commons, Medical Assistance in Dying: a Patient-Centred Approach. Report of the
Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying (February 2016) (Chairs: Kelvin Kenneth
Ogilvie & Robert Oliphant) [Committee Report]; Medical Assistance in Dying Act, SC 2016, c 3,
supra note 2.
50. Committee Report, ibid at 2.
51. J Bollen et al, "Organ Donation After Euthanasia: A Dutch Practical Manual" (2016) 16:7
American J Transplantation 1967.
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usual DCDD donation in that the patient's death is assured, the dying
process and any possible discomfort are foreshortened, and organ quality
improved by preventing a prolonged period of suboptimal blood flow and
oxygenation. The patient's family could be present for the death of the
patient, though they would not be able to remain after the declaration of
death due to the requirement for rapid organ recovery.
A more radical approach, but the procedure advocated in this paper,
would be to use the act of organ donation itself as the mode of death of
the patient. I do not find anything in current legislation permitting MAiD
precluding such an approach, though one might anticipate objections from
a number of quarters, not least of which might be the organ donation and
transplant community itself. It would also require regulatory changes, as
already discussed in the context of imminent death donation, so that these
individuals would not be considered living donors, from the perspective of
"living donor deaths" which are appropriately intensely scrutinized.
With the use of donation as the mode of death, the patient would be
transported to the operating room and anesthetized. The patient's family
could accompany the patient, and remain until anesthesia was administered.
The organ donation operation would then proceed as for a brain-dead
organ donor, other than for the requirement for continued administration
of anesthesia. Once all organs had been prepared for removal, the patient
would receive a lethal dose of medication simultaneous with the infusion
of organ preservative solution. Death would be pronounced based on
cardiac standstill, i.e., at the time of organ perfusion.
Clearly, with the proposed technique, the organ recovery itself would
function as the medical assistance in dying, though another physician or
healthcare provider could actually administer the lethal medication and
pronounce death rather than the organ recovery surgeon. Still, one might
anticipate much discomfort in the transplant community with this idea.
Both transplant surgeons and organ donation professionals have embraced
the DDR since the advent of deceased donor transplantation. The
discomfort with MAID, as opposed to current DBD or DCDD protocols,
is not grounded in philosophically sound distinctions. Rather, most in the
transplant community have accepted DBD and DCDD protocols while
rejecting MAiD because they have accepted the moral fiction that all
current donors are already dead at the time of organ recovery. 2
Our proposal here is predicated on the belief that organ donation via
MAiD is a more transparent view of current organ donation practices. It
is not necessary for such an approach to result in an increase in organs
52. Miller, Truog & Brock, supra note 29.
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donated. In fact, one might expect criticism if it was believed that this
proposal involved ethical slight-of-hand solely to allow for more organs.
Nonetheless, recognition of a potential increase in organs recovered may
serve the purpose of making such a change in procedure more palatable (as
was the case with the Beecher "brain death" report). 53
There are several ways in which donation via MAiD may increase
the number of transplanted organs. It is known that the number of organs
recovered per donor from heart-beating organ donors far exceeds that
from non-heart-beating donors. This is related to the prolonged lack of
oxygen delivery to the tissues that may occur during the dying process.
As a result, kidneys, and sometimes livers, are usually recovered and
transplanted from DCDD donors, whereas hearts, lungs and pancreas are
only rarely transplanted. Although kidney graft survival is equivalent,
there is an increased requirement for early dialysis post-transplantation
in DCDD donors. Both in North America and in Europe, only an average
of two organs are transplanted from each DCDD donor, but a mean of
3.5 organs are transplanted from DBD donors. 4 If organ donation were
to proceed following MAID, allowing for more regular recovery of the
liver and potentially other organs from DCDD donors, the time of poor
perfusion would be significantly truncated, allowing for more regular
recovery of liver and potentially other organs. It might be useful to compare
the procedure proposed for MAiD (euthanasia) with that currently used in
DCDD donation (Table 3):
Table 3. DCDD Donation vs MAiD by Organ Donation
Current DCDD Protocols MAiD by Organ Donation
Death occurs, but unpredictably, no Patient alive but anesthetized until
organs recovered in 30-50% organ recovery
Potential for discomfort during the No potential for discomfort
dying process (anesthesia)
Not certain patient is dead at time of Death results from irreversible
organ recovery cessation of cardiac function
Organs Recovered limited to kidneys, Organs recovered might include
sometimes liver, rarely pancreas heart, lungs, liver, kidneys,
pancreas, intestine
53. Henry K Beecher et al, "A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of
the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death" (1968) 205:6 JAMA 337.
54. DJ Reiche et al, "ASTS Recommended Practice Guidelines for Controlled Donation after
Cardiac Death Organ Procurement and Transplantation" (2009) 9:9 American J of Transplantation
2004.
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Thirdly, the availability of organ donation via MAiD might increase
the organ donor pool. There are many patients in whom life-sustaining
therapy is withdrawn who are not considered for DCDD because they
are not expected to die within a timeframe suitable for organ donation.
Euthanasia would make such patients viable donation candidates.
Additionally, patients not on life-support, but whose lives are intolerable,
and are appropriate candidates for MAID, might also consider themselves
for organ donation.
The current regulatory requirement for real-time, first-person consent
for MAiD could severely limit potential MAiD candidates. If MAiD is
subsequently extended, permitting the use of advanced directives, or
surrogate consent, the pool of potential donors would be significantly
increased. With appropriate safeguards, such a broadening of the
application of MAiD would be ethically appropriate.
An actual clinical case, well-publicized in the US, might serve as a
useful example. The patient was a 44 year-old man with ALS, awake and
alert on a ventilator, with no spontaneous respiratory ability. He could not
move any part of his body, except his eyes. "I was always interested in
organ donation and had checked the box on my license," the patient said
through a machine that spoke for him.55 The patient expressed that life
was intolerable, and wished to come off the ventilator and be allowed to
die. He also wished to donate his organs, and had frequently discussed
both of these viewpoints with his spouse and with his physicians. Clearly
this patient had several goals: to have control over the time and manner
of his death, to have as comfortable a death as possible, and to donate
organs. There was no medical uncertainty about the patient's rapid death
once the ventilator was disconnected. There was also no question that the
patient was not imminently dying, and might have lived for a prolonged
period, had he remained on the ventilator. The patient could have died at
home, but that would have precluded organ donation. He needed to be
admitted to the hospital to have his wish granted. This proved impossible
in the hospital where he had been receiving his care because, although the
request was approved by the hospital ethics committee, it was stopped by
the hospital's lawyers because of concerns that "it looked too much like
assisted suicide."56 Even so, his only option under current US law was
to become a DCDD donor, which he ultimately did at different hospital,
donating both his liver and kidneys. Had he been allowed to undergo organ
55. Karen Shakerdge, "A Dying Man's Wish to Donate His Organs Gets Complicated," National
Public Radio (26 December 2016), online: <www.npr.org> [perma.cc/2HJ4-PNUJ].
56. Ibid.
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donation via MAID, he would have still retained control over his death, his
comfort would have been assured, and he may well have also been able to
donate an additional four organs.
Are there negative aspects of MAiD via organ donation in comparison
to how MAiD is currently performed? In the absence of the desire for
organ donation, MAiD can take place at home, in a familiar, comfortable
setting, surrounded by family and loved ones. Family members may
remain with the patient after death, if desired. These comforting options
are quite limited if organ donation is to occur in the setting of MAID,
but this is not different whether MAiD is followed by DCDD donation,
or whether donation is itself the mechanism of MAiD (Table 4). These
limitations are based on the requirement to limit the elapsed time between
the loss of oxygen flowing to the organs to be recovered, and their actual
recovery. Patients, and their families, will need to balance these intrusions
with the emotional benefit associated with organ donation.
Table 4. Current MAiD (Euthanasia vs Euthansia by Organ Donation)
Current Euthanasia policy Euthanasia by Organ Donation
Can take place at home Must take place in hospital
Family present, if desired Family must say goodbye after
induction of anesthesia
Death by pharmacologic means Anesthesia induced prior to
beginning operation.
No discomfort No discomfort
Family can stay with patient after Family could reunite with patient
death after surgery completed
Certainly, changing the public's perception of organ donation from one
of removing organs from one who has already died to that of causing the
death of an individual by organ donation may require some adjustment,
and could impact the current willingness of some to become donors, or to
donate their loved ones' organs. However, many studies over the past 20
years continue to demonstrate confusion on the part of the public, and even
medical professionals, about both the criteria for the diagnosis of brain
death, and whether brain dead, but heart-beating individuals are actually
dead." It is still not unusual to encounter physicians in the US who believe,
erroneously, that DCDD procedures include the removal of organs prior to
withdrawal of life-sustaining interventions, with subsequent termination
of life-sustaining therapy and pronouncement. Any significant change in
57. James M Dubois & Emily E Anderson, "Attitudes toward death criteria and organ donation
among healthcare personnel and the general public" (2006) 16:1 Progress in Transplantation 65.
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organ retrieval practices would, therefore, require an extensive public and
professional education effort.
Conclusion
The increasing acceptance, at least in some countries, of active euthanasia
(termed Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada) for those with intolerable
suffering, has created an opportunity to re-examine the current methods
for the determination of death, especially in the context of organ donation.
It permits consideration of an alternative approach to the moral dilemma
ansing from the need to recover organs for transplantation, on the one
hand, and concerns about whether all current organ donors are actually
dead, thus violating the dead donor rule, on the other. The organ donation
community has, since early in the history of transplantation, engaged in
what Miller, Truog and Brock have termed "moral fictions."58 The fictions
help us deal with the cognitive dissonance that results from the conflict
between our moral beliefs and our behaviors. These fictions have reassured
both transplant professionals, who do not wish to feel they are responsible
for the death of their donors, and the public at large. But they are fictions
nonetheless. There is no urgent need to change the procedures currently
used for organ recovery, though there are multiple benefits to considering
the use of voluntary active euthanasia. It is time, though, for an honest
discussion in transplant circles, and in society at large, about providing
patients and families with the best care at the end-of-life, in a way that is
both respectful of the patient, and of benefit to society.
58. Supra note 29.
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